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Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration 
and reverence the more often and more steadily one considers 
them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.  
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:161) 
 
Is there, however, any true transcendence, or is this idea always a 
consoling dream projected by human need onto an empty sky?  





Murdoch’s relation to Kant is a delicate, complex topic.  On what might be called the received 
view, Kant is Murdoch’s philosophical enemy: a moral universalist offering a skewed picture of 
the nature of moral activity and the chief substance of moral concern.1  Some recent work 
pushes against the received view, either arguing that the centrality of love in Murdochian ethics 
has roots in Kant’s notion of respect,2 or exposing, more generally, the Kantian lines that run 
alongside the far more frequently observed Platonic lines of her ethics.3  Much of this work 
focuses on the three essays in The Sovereignty of Good,4 where Murdoch at least appears more 
ambivalent about Kant than she is in earlier work — such as her 1959 “The Sublime and the 
Good”, where she unabashedly deems “Kant’s ethical theory […] one of the most beautiful and 
exciting things in the whole of philosophy” (S&G 212).  The context of this enthusiastic 
assessment is her remarking, more particularly, on the “suggestive, indeed intoxicating” 
connection between Kant’s ethical theory and aesthetic theory of the sublime that is mediated by 
his conception of respect or Achtung (S&G 212).  My aim in this chapter is to examine 
Murdoch’s relation to Kant by following this clue: as we will see, it proves not to be a single-
issue approach, but one that will lead us to central concerns of Murdoch’s distinctive conception 
of ethics as developed in Sovereignty.  
 Let me first say something about the basic difficulty of our inquiry, so that we set out in 
the right frame of mind.  Our topic requires us to keep track of how Murdoch distinguishes 
Kant from the neo-Kantianism that constitutes her main target in Sovereignty and earlier essays.  
Although one might accuse proponents of the received view of failing to register this distinction, 
one might equally express frustration at Murdoch’s sweeping and idiosyncratic approach to 
intellectual history.  She “roughly” characterises her main neo-Kantian target as “a Protestant, 
liberal, empiricist way of conceiving morality” (M&E, 70), an outlook that in Murdoch’s 
estimation includes Romanticism in her “own somewhat narrow sense” (SBR 271) as marked by 
“cult of personality and denial of external authority” (SBR 275), as well as existentialism and 
ordinary-language philosophy.  To further complicate matters, Murdoch names Kant as the 
“source not only of this Liberal morality, but also of a modern version of its opposite”: the 
Natural Law morality she populates with “Thomists, Hegelians, [and] Marxists” and which sees 
“the individual […] as moving tentatively vis-à-vis a reality which transcends him” (M&E 68 and 
 
1 Locus classicus might be Blum (1994).   
2 For quite different accounts, see Velleman (1999), Bagnoli (2003), and Merritt (2017a).   
3 E.g. Broakes (2012), and Antonaccio (2012:pp.105-125).  
4 These essays were first published between 1964 and 1969. 
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70).  The sprawling genealogy is bound to raise the hackles of scholarly caution;5 but 
understanding Murdoch’s genealogy on its own terms will guide our inquiry at various points 
along the way.  At present, I simply want to draw some preliminary observations about the 
nature of Murdoch’s engagement with Kant.   
Once we recognise that Murdoch distinguishes Kant from her neo-Kantian target, we 
might then assume her project is one of retrieval: to restore the true Kant from however he has 
been misappropriated by neo-Kantians.  But this cannot quite be the case, as we can glean from 
her telling suggestion that Kant’s “handsome conception of the sublime” (SGC 367[79]) is 
“possibly even more interesting than Kant realised” (OGG 359[71]).  The remark echoes Kant’s 
own claim to have understood Plato better than Plato understood himself (Critique of Pure Reason 
A314/B370). Let me first say something about the spirit of these remarks, then their substance.  
They carry the sense of appreciating what a predecessor’s position might look like if it were 
rendered consistent with its best thought.  For Kant, this means taking the upshot of the 
Platonic theory of recollection to be that the idea of the Good can only have its source in pure 
reason itself; as a result, this idea cannot be assumed to be “chimerical” despite the fact that no 
sensibly given “pattern” of action or character can ever be fully adequate to it (A313-5/B370-2).  
Now, one of Kant’s aims in the first Critique is to reconceive metaphysics under a principle of 
epistemic humility: knowledge, in the sense of theoretical cognition (Erkenntnis), is limited to 
objects of possible experience.  Yet here Kant gestures towards the separate project of a 
metaphysics of morals, one that draws substantive ethical conclusions from the nature of 
practical reason.  Surely it, too, must be consistent with the principle of epistemic humility.  But 
how do we understand the reality of the good if no sensibly given pattern of action or character 
can ever be fully adequate to it?  For Murdoch, I will argue, a consistent answer to this question 
lies in reworking his conception of the sublime.    
Of course, the value of Kant’s conception of the sublime for Murdoch does not consist 
in its being the solution to an interpretive puzzle.  Her aims are not chiefly exegetical.  Her 
project is not one of straightforward retrieval.  Rather, thinking through Kant allows her to 
develop some of the distinctive features of her ethics.  These developments begin with a 
proclamation: “The theory of the sublime ought to be Kant’s theory of tragedy” (S&G 213).  
Explaining the boldness and significance of this move — both philosophically on its own terms, 
and interpretively vis-à-vis Kant, will occupy me throughout this chapter.  But let me connect 
some dots in a provisional fashion.  Tragedy is a story that denies us the consolation of seeing 
things turn out well in the end.  Our need for consolation, by Murdoch’s lights, is one of the 
central dangers of moral life.  And yet, as we will see, the Kantian conception of the sublime — 
in its original context and formulation — offers some kind of consolation.  Murdoch’s 
reworking of the Kantian sublime as a theory of tragedy is therefore subversive, for two reasons: 
first, her reworking pointedly denies it any consolatory function; and second, she deploys the 
reworked conception to argue that “[a]rt and morals are […] one” (S&G 215; cf. OGG 348[58]) 
— a thesis that, despite the genuine connection between sublimity and morality for Kant, she 
well recognises is a challenge to him.    
 By now we should have some sense of the complexity of our topic: not only do we need 
to keep track of how Murdoch distinguishes Kant from her neo-Kantian target, but we also need 
to see that her interest in Kant is not tidily sequestered in some one area of his thought.  Next 
we must turn to the substantive issues of her engagement with Kant, which I have only 





5 A full assessment of its interpretive and historical adequacy lies both beyond the scope of this chapter and my own 
ability; I will naturally weigh in on the adequacy of Murdoch’s understanding of Kant, but only where doing so 
stands to improve our understanding of Murdoch.   
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Sublimity and consolation   
 
Our first question is what consolation is, and what it has to do with the sublime.  I begin by 
considering how they are explicitly linked by Seneca, and implicitly by Kant.  I then aim to clarify 
what attracts Murdoch to Kant’s conception of the sublime, and how she distinguishes his 
success from the general failure of the Liberal line of neo-Kantianism.  But we must also 
understand how a charitably-interpreted Kant nevertheless goes wrong in her view.  The answer, 
I propose, lies in the epistemic presumption required by the consolations of the Kantian sublime.  
Appreciating this point will allow us to understand the rationale of Murdoch’s proposal to 
rework the Kantian sublime as a theory of tragedy, which we then examine in the following 
section.  
 
Seneca and Kant   
 
Consolation is a form of address that aims to reorient the perspective of someone grieving or 
suffering, to show that what seems bad isn’t really.  This conception of consolation is cued to 
Stoic philosophy, which admits virtue as the only genuine good;6 but such a thought is not — 
simply as such — utterly alien to Murdoch, who was prepared to countenance only an “austere” 
consolation that might teach “that nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be 
virtuous” (SGC 371[85]).  The central argument of Seneca’s Consolation to Helvia — styled as a 
letter to his mother from exile in Corsica — turns on the Stoic supposition that, as rational 
beings, we have a special place in the rational order of creation: to perfect one’s essentially 
rational nature by becoming virtuous is to participate fully in, and in some measure to sustain, 
this order.7  Thus Seneca takes solace at the thought that the human mind “which surveys the 
world and marvels at it […] is the most glorious part of it” (8.4).  The paradigmatic manifestation 
of this order, in many Stoic writings, is the movement of the heavenly bodies.  Seneca dwells on 
the sublimity of this outlook: “so long as my eyes are not directed away from that spectacle, 
which they can never look on enough; so long as I may watch the sun and the moon and fix my 
gaze on the other planets” (8.6) — he goes on in this vein — and eventually concludes that “so 
long” as he sustains his contemplation of “the kindred objects on high” it makes no difference 
“what ground” he treads (8.6).  The spectacle is sublime — literally “uplifting”8 — because it 
directs his attention to his true calling as a rational being, consoling him for his present 
circumstances that form no genuine obstacle to it.  
Kant’s account of the sublime draws both from a neo-Stoic German rationalist tradition 
that conceives of sublimity as rational perfection that may be manifest in the magnificent order of 
nature, as well as from an Anglophone tradition that lacks these commitments about nature, and 
conceives of its sublimity as a “rude kind of magnificence”, in the memorable phrase of Joseph 
Addison.9  The Stoic-rationalist influence emerges in Kant’s famous “starry heavens” passage 
from the 1788 Critique of Practical Reason (see this chapter’s first epigraph), where he gazes out at 
“an unbounded magnitude with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems” (CPrR 5:162); but 
the Anglophone influence emerges in the examples running throughout his Analytic of the 
Sublime in the 1790 Critique of Judgment, where sublimity is a certain state of mind aroused by a 
raw, unformed, and violently indifferent nature.  These dual influences partly account for an 
ambiguity in Kant’s conception of the sublime — one that at least partly explains how Murdoch 
 
6 On a mainstream conception without this evaluative commitment: consolation aims to show that what one suffers 
isn’t as bad as it seems.   
7 Consolation to Helvia (8.1-6) at Seneca (2014:pp.55-6).  
8 The Latin and German words for “sublime” come from verbs meaning to raise, or lift up (sublīmo, erheben), with 
English deriving from Latin.   
9 Addison, Spectator no. 412 (Bond 1965:p.540).  On the distinct influences of neo-Stoic German rationalist and 
Anglophone sources on Kant’s account of the sublime, see Merritt (2018).   
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could place him as the progenitor of both Natural Law and Liberal morality, respectively.  But 
my account will focus on the Kantian sublime as it animates Murdoch’s expansively conceived 
neo-Kantian Liberal tradition.  Thus I will begin by outlining Kant’s account of the sublime in 
the third Critique, and then turn to its link to the moral feeling of respect — considering it both 
on its own terms, and in Murdoch’s charitable and critical assessment of it.   
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant considers two kinds of aesthetic judgment of nature: one 
in which we enjoy its beauty, the other its sublimity.  While we enjoy beauty in a state of 
unadulterated liking, our enjoyment of the sublime is mixed: we are at once attracted and 
repulsed.  Kant begins with the observation that “We call sublime that which is absolutely 
great” (CJ 5:248).  But nothing in nature can be absolutely great: no matter how big or powerful 
something is, it can only ever be comparatively so.  Thus our enjoyment of natural sublimity 
requires the right perspective: we need to be so situated that large and powerful objects figure as 
absolutely great.  Kant distinguishes sublimity of size and of power as the “mathematical” and 
the “dynamical” sublime, respectively.10  While they can be comingled in any judgment of the 
sublime — e.g. of a massive and crushing surf — they work somewhat differently in each case.  
In the first, I try to take in (“apprehend”) a massive object, but continually struggle and just fail 
to hold it in my sights all at once — as in Kant’s outlier example of architectural sublimity, 
standing under the dome at St. Peters (CJ 5:252).  In the second, I have a visceral appreciation of 
nature’s power to annihilate me in my physical existence — e.g. of the power of the surf to 
thrash me against these rocks and suck me out into the deep — while yet feeling in sufficient 
safety to dwell upon these sensations.  These are disorienting, assaulting experiences that bring 
us face-to-face with our physical limitations.  That is the repulsive element of the judgment.  Yet 
we linger over natural sublimity.  Attraction is its governing valence.  Why should we enjoy such 
assaulting experiences?   
Kant’s answer, in outline, is that these assaults throw our attention onto the power of our 
rational faculty, which is not held back or threatened by them.  In the case of the mathematical 
sublime, this is our power to conceive totalities in mere thought that we could never apprehend 
through the senses.  And the dynamical sublime, Kant explains, “calls forth our power” to regard 
the “worldly goods” with which we are typically preoccupied as “trivial [klein]”; and thus to 
regard nature’s “might” as something we are indeed subjected to, but “not as the sort of 
dominion over ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow if it came down to 
our highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment” (CJ 5:262).  Moreover, our 
enjoyment of dynamical sublimity does not just lie in the relief that comes with recognition of 
our real safety from the threat;11 it lies in a positive attraction to another standard of value, “a 
unit against which everything in nature is small” or trivial (klein, CJ 5:261).  Here the third 
Critique points outside of itself, to the standard of virtue that can only be conceived in pure 
thought, through the moral law. 
Now we come to the delicate question of the relation between natural and moral 
sublimity in Kant’s account.  Our enjoyment of natural sublimity does not involve our having 
this standard actively in mind.12  Yet we must have developed some attunement to this standard, 
and how it calls us to moral life, in order to take this enjoyment in the rude magnificence of 
nature.13  Kant, moreover, takes our feeling for natural sublimity to be an analogue of the moral 
feeling of respect, or Achtung: we, as it were, substitute the one for the other (CJ 5:257).  Kant 
even allows that the enjoyment of natural sublimity produces an “attunement of the mind” 
which is what is truly sublime (CJ 5:250).  This sublimity of mind is not identical with, but 
 
10 The mathematical sublime is the topic of Critique of Judgment §§25-27 (5:248-60) and the dynamical §§28-29 (5:260-
66); I argue for the unity of these two accounts in Merritt (2018:pp.32-4, 41-50).  
11 As it does for Burke and others in the Anglophone tradition: see Merritt (2018:pp.40-1). 
12 This has to do with the “disinterestedness” of aesthetic judgments of reflection generally, a technical issue I have 
bracketed here; for discussion see Merritt (2018:pp.27-32, 50-1).    
13 This is what Kant means when he says it requires, as a precondition, “cultivation [Cultur]” (CJ 5:265).   
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nevertheless “compatible with that which the influence of determinate (practical) ideas on feeling 
would produce” (CJ 5:256).  At the same time, Kant wants to avoid concluding that the 
enjoyment of natural sublimity can directly promote our moral development, since it does not 
involve any determinate idea of the good.   
As a result, it can seem as if Kant takes our enjoyment of natural sublimity to be empty: 
our minds are moved in a manner that is like the moral feeling of respect, but with no 
substantive moral commitment of any kind.  But this impression must be somewhat mistaken —
it is certainly too crude — if our readiness to enjoy natural sublimity should require having 
developed substantive moral commitments of a Kantian sort.14  As we are about to see, Murdoch 
finds this mistake pronounced in the Romantic strand of the Liberal neo-Kantian tradition.   
 
Kant and Liberal neo-Kantianism 
 
Thus we need to return to Murdoch’s intellectual genealogy, and specifically the broadly 
conceived Liberal tradition that she sees as descending from Kant.  In her telling, Kant “made 
systematic” a critique of metaphysics that was already part of the Anglophone philosophical 
tradition (M&E 64), the cornerstone of which is the principle that knowledge (Erkenntnis) is 
limited to objects of possible experience.  For Kant, this yields a dualism of fact and value that 
treats the latter “as an object of faith (not knowledge)” (DPR 194); but for neo-Kantians who 
have lost this sort of faith, it entails any range of expressivist or constructivist positions where 
value is a function of the freely choosing will (DPR 195, SGC 366[78-9]).  The neo-Kantian 
model combines an “unexamined” (scientistic) “sense of the strength of the machine” — nature 
— “with an illusion of leaping out of it” at important moments of choice (OGG 338[47]; see 
also IP 319[24], 321[26], 329[36]).  The model has catastrophic implications for ethics, in 
Murdoch’s view, beginning with its conception of the person as an “isolated will” — isolated, 
because in principle uncompelled by, its beliefs about the world (IP 304-5[7-8]), and thereby 
isolated from other persons as well: “Even the presence of others is felt, if at all, simply as the 
presence of rational critics” (SBR 268; see also AD 288).  These commitments, Murdoch 
contends, are widely shared: “The younger Sartre, and many British moral philosophers, 
represent this last dry distilment of Kant’s views of the world” (OGG 338[47]).   
But for Kant, human freedom is not ultimately conceived in merely negative terms, as 
freedom from determination by the causal order of material nature; it must fundamentally be 
understood in positive terms, as our power to determine ourselves to action simply through the 
moral law, which Kant analyses as the principle of the autonomy of a rational will.15 The moral 
law is the principle of personhood, i.e. of an ontological order distinct from the domain of 
material nature.  Murdoch recognises this, and thereby reads Kant as a kind of moral realist — 
“Kant believed in Reason […] and […] this was a form of a belief in an external reality” (OGG 
338[46]; see also IP 323-4[30]).16  For Murdoch, this is a large part of what Kant got right: there 
is a reality to acknowledge in the practical, will-determining exercise of reason.  Respect (Achtung) 
is the felt appreciation of this reality.17  Kant sometimes suggests that the object of respect is 
properly the moral law itself, sometimes persons (irrespective of character), and sometimes 
persons exemplifying excellence of character, or virtue.18  These turn out to be facets of one 
view, with respect for the moral law as foundational: persons are owed respect simply as agents 
 
14 I thus read Kant’s account of our enjoyment of natural sublimity as ultimately having a moral source (Merritt 2018); 
for an opposing view, consider Doran (2015) and Crowther (1989). 
15 Chiefly in Groundwork II (4:406-45) and Critique of Practical Reason, Analytic, Chapter 1 (5:19-57).   
16 Liberal neo-Kantian tradition retains the dualism of nature and freedom, but loses any substantive commitment to 
this reality: this is how existentialist Angst descends from Kantian Achtung according to Murdoch (IP 331[38]). 
17 Merritt (2017b) develops this point along broadly Murdochian lines.   
18 For discussion of these differences, consider Darwall (2008).   
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with a rational will, the constitutive principle of which is the moral law; and persons can 
respected — in awe-struck fashion — as evincing the perfection of the rational will, or virtue. 
The sort of respect that is most readily linked to the feeling of the sublime is the awe-
struck sort that takes the manifestation of human goodness as its object.  Kant describes it in the 
following vignette:   
 
[B]efore a humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher 
degree than I am aware of in myself my spirit bows, whether I want it or whether I do not 
and hold my head ever so high, that he may not overlook my superior position.  Why is 
this?  His example holds before me a law that strikes down my self-conceit when I 
compare it with my own conduct, and I see observance of that law and hence its 
practicability proved before me in fact. (KpV 5:76-7) 
 
Kant explicates his feeling as having the same bivalent structure found in judgments of the 
sublime: there is something repelling in having his self-justifying worldview “struck down” by 
the example of another’s goodness, and yet he is attracted to this example — indeed, it compels 
him.  Kant’s “man” is not the “isolated will” of neo-Kantianism: he is not “totally unguided and 
alone” (IP 324[30]).  Surely this must be part of what struck Murdoch as “marvellously near the 
mark” in Kant’s conception of respect (S&G 216): Kant describes being compelled by the reality 
of another person.  And so his spirit bows, which is something he full well does — though not 
through any empty assertion of self, and not in any publicly available domain of phenomenally 
given facts.   
 It all seems quite Murdochian, one might say — except that, on closer inspection, the 
“humble common man” does not obviously figure as an individual.  The details of the vignette are 
not so much indications of the reality of this person, as devices to illustrate the indifference of 
moral requirement to social station.  The compelling reality is not the “humble common man” 
himself, but the standard of goodness shown to be practicable through his conduct.  And this 
standard lies in each of us — not, normally, in the actuality of virtue, but simply as the moral law 
that Kant takes to be constitutive of reason in its practical capacity.  Yet we still hover over the 
spot where Murdoch finds Kant to be “marvellously near the mark”: for Kant, by her lights, 
understood full well that “that endless aspiration to perfection which is characteristic of moral 
activity” (IP 324[30]).  Thus if Kant tells us to feel respect for “the universal reason” in our 
breasts (S&G 215), it is not so that we may each turn inwards and be awe-struck by our own 
perfection;19 it is rather because we thereby have some access to the idea of perfection that alone 
can guide any genuine effort to become good.   
Unfortunately, the “humble common man” nevertheless seems like a mere occasioning 
stimulus to such reflection, rather than its substantive concern — and thereby uncomfortably 
akin to craggy peaks and crashing surf, and so on.  For Murdoch, the stubborn difficulty of 
Kant’s legacy turns on this point.  Murdoch repeatedly — one might almost say obsessively — 
marvels at Kant’s injunction in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals that “the Holy One of 
the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he is recognised as 
such” (4:408): here is a religion with an individual at its centre, she muses, yet Kant tells us “turn 
back to the pattern of rationality in our own bosoms and decide whether or not we approve of 
the man we see” (IP 323-4[29-30]; see also SGC 78, VCM 91).  His words, she allows, can make 
him seem like “a backer of the existentialist view” — but, she insists, this is an interpretive 
mistake: Kant was “not an existentialist” because he was committed to “a moral reality” that is 
the proper object of respect (IP 323-4[30]).   
Here Murdoch draws a clear line between Kant and his Liberal descendants (specifically 
existentialists), which she does not draw in the case of the aesthetic judgment of the sublime.  
 
19 That (uncharitable) reading of Kant’s view of the sublime can be traced to Herder; see Zuckert (2003) and Merritt 
(2018:pp.24-27, 45) for discussion.   
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Indeed for Murdoch, Kant’s “extremely interesting” conception of the sublime is nevertheless 
itself “a kind of romanticism” (OGG 359[71]), meaning that it involves an unsound presence of 
self (see SBR 275).  On the terms of Kant’s own theory, the magnificence of nature really is a 
mere occasioning stimulus for the feeling that Kant takes to be an analogue of the feeling of 
respect.  Any value in our enjoyment of natural sublimity ultimately lies in that analogy.  The 
craggy peaks (and so on) do not, themselves, really matter.  But the same cannot be said of the 
“humble common man”: he cannot be taken as mere occasioning stimulus for a feeling of 
respect, on the terms of Kant’s own theory.  Kant’s mistake, Murdoch thus allows, may be more 
“a matter of tactics” than substance (IP 324[30]).  Let us briefly consider this failure of tactics, 
which will help us understand why she proposes to rework the Kantian theory of sublime as a 
theory of tragedy.   
 
Kant’s failure of tactics  
 
While Murdoch praises Kant for basing his metaphysics of morals on an idea of perfection, one 
recognised as “a real though infinitely distant standard” (IP 324[30]), she remains concerned 
about Kant’s assumptions about our access to this standard.  Inasmuch as Kant takes the 
standard to lie in the nature of reason itself, he will be inclined to suppose that we can in 
principle have a perfectly adequate grasp of it from where we stand.  Our “sublime” calling to 
perfect our essentially rational nature in virtue lies before us;20 and we may be consoled by the 
thought that we at least have that end determinately in view.  But for Murdoch, this is a false 
consolation: a metaphysics of morals that has learned a critical lesson about epistemic humility 
— one, we might say, that is appropriate to its subject matter — should recognise that don’t 
quite know where we are headed.  Our access to the idea of perfection can only go through the 
thick, obscure tissue of human particularity.   
To elaborate this point, consider Murdoch’s premises in “The Sovereignty of Good over 
Other Concepts”: “I assume that human beings are naturally selfish and that human life has no 
external point or τέλος” (SGC 364[76]).  The first premise she takes to be “true on the evidence” 
(364[76]), and which, on reflection, shows that the human being “constantly seeks consolation 
either through imagined inflation of self or through fictions of a theological nature” (364[77]).  
Consolation-seeking is an expression of this basic selfishness.  So she advances the second 
premise — “a view as difficult to argue as its opposite” (364[77]) — as a starting point for an 
ethical argument aimed to block some of the consolation-seeking impulses specific to 
philosophy.  So far we have considered how Kant’s conception of the sublime offers consolation 
of the self-inflating sort, which is why Murdoch takes the Kantian sublime to be itself a kind of 
romanticism.21  Yet she also takes there to be genuine promise in Kant’s conception — a 
promise that lies that lies in its connection to the feeling of respect, and thus in its resources to 
draw us to “a moral reality” that exists independently of the discretionary choices of individuals.  
Now, Murdoch says that “one of the main problems of moral philosophy” is to find “techniques 
for the purification and reorientation of an energy which is naturally selfish” (OGG 344[53]); 
and our enjoyment of the sublime — in broadly Kantian terms, but suitably corrected in its 
tactics — might turn out to be such a technique.   
Murdoch’s supposition that we need such techniques presupposes some idea of the 
human telos: good is an idea of human perfection.  And it performs some necessary sense-making 
role in moral activity: “reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world, and […] increasing 
moral sophistication reveals increasing unity” (OGG 346-7[56]).  But it matters how we arrive at 
this unity.  If we suppose that we can grasp this unity simply by reflecting on the universal reason 
within our breasts, then we will console ourselves for knowing, at least, where we are headed; 
 
20 See Kant’s remarks about the “sublimity of our moral vocation” (Rel 6:50, 6:23n, and CPrR5:87).   
21 “We experience the Sublime when we confront the awful contingency of nature or of human fate and return into 
ourselves with a proud shudder of rational power” (SGC 367[79-80])  
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and this is a self-aggrandising way of thinking that blinds us to the reality of human life.  Yet we 
need some sense of direction, some sense of unity to our efforts, some understanding of what we 
are doing, morally speaking.  Murdoch’s proposal to rework the Kantian conception of the 
sublime as a theory of tragedy aims to answer that need, without falling into the presumption of 
easy sense-making, and the sorts of consolation it provides.  
 
The Kantian sublime salvaged as a theory of tragedy  
 
In a pair of 1959 essays, “The Sublime and the Good” and “The Sublime and the Beautiful 
Revisited”, Murdoch argues that the Kantian sublime should be salvaged as a theory of tragedy: 
“We may indeed look back to Kant, not only for the source of the error, but also for the clue to 
its solution” (SBR 282).  We have been considering Murdoch’s account of Kant’s error: the 
Kantian sublime leads us back to the universal reason in our breasts, in a manner that promises 
consolation of a self-inflating, romantic sort.  In these essays, Murdoch argues that the solution 
is to see that Kant’s “theory of the sublime can be transformed into a theory of art” (SBR 282).  
Moreover, she takes this solution to be suggested by Kant himself (SBR 282).  Prima facie, this is 
surprising since, as she notes, Kant’s theory of the sublime has nothing particularly to do with 
art: “It is an uplifting emotion experienced in the Alps” (S&G 212).22  Her proposal, however, 
rests on the connection of sublimity with morality in Kant’s account; and Kantian morality 
centres on the value of persons.  Therefore we might retain the Kantian psychological model of 
the sublime, but “think of the spectator as gazing not at the Alps, but at the spectacle of human 
life” (SBR 282).  We are talking being gripped by a “spectacle” — a variety that captivates us, and 
in morally transformative ways.   
In “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, Murdoch talks about the “psychological power that derives 
from the mere idea of a transcendent object which is to some extent mysterious” (OGG 
349[59]).  The Kantian sublime is an example of how we can be compelled by “the mere idea of 
a transcendent object” — the object of the idea of perfection — in the manner of marvelling 
over it, awe-struck.  In drawing our attention to that object, the Kantian sublime reorients our 
energy to what Murdoch appears happy to think of as “our supersensible destiny” (S&G 215; 
SBR 282).  She alludes here to Kant’s conception of the human vocation or destiny (menschliche 
Bestimmung) that consists in the perfection of our essentially rational nature, a destiny he was 
happy to call “sublime” since it involves radical transformation of our evaluative point of view.23  
This deserves emphasis: Murdoch does not think that “our supersensible destiny” is part of what 
needs to be purged from the Kantian model of the sublime.  What she says, rather, is this:  
 
What stuns us into a realisation of our supersensible destiny is not, as Kant imagined, the 
formlessness of nature, but rather its unutterable particularity; and the most particular 
and individual of all natural things is the mind of man. (S&G 215; see also SBR 282) 
 
We might take this remark as further evidence that Murdoch’s claim that “human life has no 
external point or τέλος” (SGC 364[77]) should not be confused with the assertion that human 
life has no telos full stop.  She is saying that it has no external telos: there is not some 
predetermined end to achieve, so that we fulfil our role in the universe.  This allows for an 
internal telos, some kind of sense-making and direction that is internal to human life.  In a 
different context, I would argue that Kant, too, denied that human life has any such external telos 
(arguably this is the point that most separates him from the Stoics), while recognising that there 
must be one internal to human life.  But at any rate, Murdoch’s conception of what that would 
mean remains distinctive, and methodologically opposed to Kant’s.  Murdoch denies that “our 
 
22 Kant never went to the Alps; he was almost entirely reliant on travelogues and literature for his examples.   
23 See, e.g. Rel (6:50, 6:23n) and CPrR (5:87) on the sublimity of the human vocation (Bestimmung); for further 
discussion and notes on historical context, see Merritt (2018:pp.43-50).   
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supersensible destiny” comes into clear view simply by reflecting on the universal reason within 
our breasts and grasping the moral law.   
 
Our destiny can be examined but it cannot be justified or totally explained.  We are 
simply here.  And if there is any kind of sense of unity in human life, and the dream of 
this does not cease to haunt us, it is of some other kind and must be sought within a 
human experience that has nothing outside it. (SGC 365[77]) 
 
Again her point is not to deny there is a human telos, but rather to say what sort of inkling we 
might have of it: it is something we dream of, something that haunts us, something that we have 
to look for, and only by moving uncertainly within the jumble of concrete human experience.  At 
the same time, she recognises that we need some sense of direction.  The Kantian sublime offers 
a philosophical model for what it is to have some such sense of direction.  But it matters what we 
look at: “Who […] cares what sort of emotions Kant experienced in the Alps?” (SBR 264; also 
S&G 212).  What holds our attention has to be of a suitable subject matter to allow us to sense 
the appropriate direction, in an appropriate way — that is, without inviting us to make the 
epistemically unwarranted leap of supposing that we know just where we are headed.  Murdoch 
suggests that these desiderata may be best achieved through good art, and perhaps 
paradigmatically in “the great nineteenth-century novel” (SBR 271).   
 Philosophically, what chiefly interests Murdoch in these novels is “simply this: they 
contain a number of different people” (SBR 271).  This is the “spectacle of human life” that she 
claims must be the focus of a reconceived Kantian sublime.  The “great” novelist who presents 
us with this spectacle must herself be “essentially tolerant” since she “displays a real 
apprehension of persons other than the author as having a right to exist and to have a separate 
mode of being which is important and interesting to themselves” (271).24  A good novel is, for 
this reason, an “un-Romantic” art form (271), because it is not the expression of the author’s 
own personality, but rather an expression of respect for “the being and authority” of these 
characters (275).  And if the sublimity of this spectacle can be appreciated, it will not be through 
some kind of breathtaking shock or instant vision: it will dawn gradually, and be appreciated 
slowly, by the very nature of the art form.  
I allude to the contrast Murdoch draws between her own anti-Romantic position and 
that of the “Symbolist” movement associated with T.S. Eliot, T.E. Hulme and others (S&G 210; 
SBR 272-275).25  On her reading, the Symbolist way of rejecting Romantic self-assertion is to 
argue that art “should be the creation of unique self-contained things” (SBR 273).  Murdoch 
takes the Symbolist view of our appreciation of art to be a revival of the Kantian conception of 
the beautiful (SBR 273).  In Kant’s account, a beautiful object presents a suitability to our 
cognitive capacities that is independent of any cognition or comprehension of the object through 
concepts; the apprehension of the object throws our cognitive capacities into a “free play”, as 
they are not occupied with the business of cognition, and we enjoy this suitability of the object to 
our cognitive faculties with a distinctive kind of reflective pleasure (CJ 5:217).  In Murdoch’s 
plausible interpretation of Kant, the enjoyment of beauty is instantaneous with the apprehension of 
the beautiful object.  But the theory is not obviously applicable to serious art, at least the sort 
that interests Murdoch: “This is […] a picture that will suit our apprehension of a rose, but not 
our apprehension of King Lear” (S&G 210). The point, which she downplays, seems central to 
her claims for the genuinely un-Romantic, or un-self-asserting, credentials of the great novel.  
The Symbolist suggestion that we appreciate art instantaneously, in the moment of perception 
 
24 Ultimately, Murdoch decides “tolerance” is too tame a word for the virtue she has in mind, which is really love 
(SBR 275 and 283; see also S&G 215) — though she speaks this way to acknowledge that the great novel manifests 
“the Liberal spirit at its best and richest” before it succumbs to Romanticism (SBR 271). 
25 I am not in a position to provide independent assessment of her interpretation of Symbolist aesthetics; here I am 
simply reporting her view.   
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itself, suggests a sense of easy mastery that is at odds with respecting its purported independence: 
“one aspect of respecting something is being interested enough in it to try to understand it” 
(SBR 275) — and that takes time.    
For Murdoch, aesthetic experience on an anti-Romantic model needs to progress slowly 
and uncertainly, holding our attention to the “unutterable particularity” of human ways of being 
minded.  We are to be awe-struck by this spectacle of humanity, where this is no mere stimulus 
that throws our attention back upon the universal reason in our breasts.  We well and truly look 
out.  The subject of this reworked Kantian sublime,  
 
faced by the manifold of humanity, may feel, as well as terror, delight, but not, if he really 
sees what is before him, superiority.  He will suffer that undramatic, because un-self-
centred, agnosticism which goes with tolerance.  To understand other people is a task 
which does not come to an end. (SBR 283)  
 
Apprehending the spectacle, if we do it at all truthfully, “is not easy” (SBR 282).  This is not 
because its vastness is assaulting to me — as in the Kantian sublime — but because of the 
overwhelming intricacy and diversity of real human personality that it presents.  But the difficulty 
is not only that there is more here than we can make tidy sense of; it is also that bits of the 
tableau elude our powers of sense-making.  Murdoch later remarks on the “almost insuperable 
difficulty of looking properly at evil and human suffering” — of attending properly “without 
falsifying the picture in some way while making it bearable” (OGG 359[71]).  One form of 
falsification is to suppose that it all makes some kind of sense, that evil and suffering have some 
proper place in the rational order of things.  This is a form of consolation, an invitation to think 
that what seems bad isn’t on the long the view; and it rests on the epistemic presumption that 
“the inexhaustible variety of the world”, which of course includes evil and suffering, is systematic 
and comprehensible (see SGC 381[96]).  Murdoch’s proposal to rework the Kantian sublime not 
just as a theory of art, but specifically of tragedy, is designed to block this presumption and the 
consolations it invites.   
 This brings us back to the fact that her reworked sublime sails under the motto “[a]rt and 
morals are […] one” (S&G 215). Good art allows us to take in the human spectacle, and the 
unutterable particularity of the world more generally, with — as she later says — “a sense of unity 
and form” (SGC 371[84], my emphasis).  This is another delicate point.  Philosophy’s 
occupational hazard is to systematise under unifying principles, which can readily offer the 
impression of easy sense-making that is conducive to consolation.  Yet something similar might 
be said about story-telling: “Any story which we tell about ourselves consoles us since it imposes 
a pattern upon something which might otherwise seem intolerably chancy and incomplete.  
However, human life is chancy and incomplete” (SGC 371[84]).  Good art allows us to “steadily 
contemplate” this fact (371[84]).  But it cannot do this by imposing a pattern on the unutterable 
particularity.  Such patterns could only come from the drearily “familiar rat-runs of selfish day-
dream” (371[84]).  Good art is mysterious, but not fantastic: it helps us apprehend the spectacle 
truthfully, with a continually developing sense of unity and form.  This is the inexhaustibility of 
good art, by which it provides “training in the love of virtue” (371[84]).   
 
History and consolation  
 
For Murdoch, consolation-seeking is an expression of our natural selfishness.  As we noted, she 
suggests that we seek consolation in two basic ways: either through “imagined inflation of self” 
or “fictions of a theological nature” (SGC 364[77]).  We have mostly been considering her 
relation to the Kantian sublime as offering consolation of the first sort, and thus as animating 
certain features of a broadly conceived Liberal neo-Kantian tradition.  By way of conclusion, we 
might wonder whether Kant has any role to play in consolations of the second sort — and if so, 
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whether this changes anything about Murdoch’s assessment of him.  For in fact Kant never 
explicitly announces his theory of the sublime as serving a consolatory purpose — but he does 
say as much about the conception of human history he outlines in his 1785 essay “Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” (see 8:30).  The premise of that essay is a broadly 
Stoic conception of providential teleology, and particularly a conception of the human being as a 
creature endowed with everything that he needs to reach his telos, the perfection of his 
essentially rational nature (8:18-9).  For Murdoch this would surely count as a “fiction of a 
theological nature”.  Kant’s move against the Stoic tradition in this context is to insist that our 
inevitable yet self-inflicted corruption — what he later elucidates in the Religion as “the radical 
evil in human nature” (6:18) — must be part of the story of how we develop to completion from 
these providential endowments.  We can be consoled for human evil, and the suffering that we 
inflict on ourselves and others by its means, as bits of a story that might still turn out well.  
Indeed, for Kant what justifies the consolation and any “theological fiction” on which it rests, is 
that it encourages us to do the things we need to do to make this ending possible, to reach our 
telic goal of goodness.26   
 Murdoch may then be too quick to assume that “Kant is afraid of the particular, he is 
afraid of history” (S&G 214).  Kant has things to say about history, and even in this context 
waxes on about the stunning range of ways we find to be evil on the “great stage of the world” 
(Idea 8:17-8), pointing to “the scenes of unprovoked cruelty in the ritual murders of Tofoa” and 
“the perpetual war between the Arathapescaw Indians and the Dog Rib Indians” that aims only 
at slaughter for its own sake, to the “long litany of charges against humankind” that he lodged 
closer to home, like the “secret falsity in the most intimate friendship” (Rel 6:33).  He means to 
convey a sense of the inexhaustibility of it all.  Yet he does so with a distinct air of boredness.  It 
all comes from the same place: the “radical evil” that he is in the course of theorising in the 
Religion.  Thus in the end we have another example — indeed one that Kant explicitly offers as 
such — of how philosophical theorising lends itself to consolatory aims.  Not only can we 
explain the astonishing variety of human evil on this principle, we can situate this principle and 
all the badness that flows from it in the context of a developmental story that explains how we 
are still capable of doing the things we need to do to become good.  Therefore, if we should 
accept Murdoch’s worries about the pervasive moral dangers of consolation, we would have 
another reason to endorse her provocative conclusion that we may need good art more than 
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